



R E S E A R C H T R I A N G L E I N S T I T U T E

AD 763 422

FR-51U-533

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION
EVALUATION OF CIVILIAN TECHNIQUES.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

by
Philip S. McMullan and others.
Martin F. Massoglia
Benjamin S. H. Harris, III
November 1972 10 p.

Sponsored by:
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
ARPA Order Nr. 1444

under
Contract No. DAAH01-70-C-0949
U.S. Army Missile Command

RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE
Office of Institute Programs

RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE
POST OFFICE BOX 12194
RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK, NORTH CAROLINA 27709



10 July 1973

Commanding General
U.S. Army Missile Command
Attn: AMSMI-RNM
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809

Reference: Contract DAAH01-70-C-0949, Military Civic Action
(Evaluation of Civilian Techniques)

Dear Sir:

As required by paragraph 4.1 Technical Requirement Nr. 1209, a part of the referenced contract, there are submitted herewith two copies of the Final Technical Report (Final Publication). Distribution has been made to others in accordance with the attached distribution list.

Truly yours,

P. S. McMullan, Jr.
P. S. McMullan, Jr.
Senior Analyst

PSMjr/smp

cc: Attached Distribution List

R. L. Bobbitt, Jr., DCASR-Atlanta (w/o enclosure)
S. A. Fedak, USAMICOM (w/o enclosure)

Executive Office of the President

Executive Office of the President
Special Study Group, Vietnam
Washington, D. C. 20501

1

Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20506

1

Department of Defense

Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency
ATTN: Program Management
1400 Wilson Blvd
Arlington, Virginia 22209

3

Director, Tactical Technology Office
Advanced Research Projects Agency
1400 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209

3

ARPA R&D Field Representative
J-3, UNC/USFK
APO San Francisco 96301

1

ARPA R&D Field Unit
APO San Francisco 96243

1

~~ARPA RDFO (Middle East)~~
~~Beirut, Dept of State~~
~~Washington, D. C. 20521~~

1

"AIR-POUCH"

Armed Forces Staff College (Library)
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

1

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)
Washington, D. C. 20301

1

OASD (International Security Affairs)
Director of Policy & Plans
Washington, D. C. 20301

1

ARPA-E
HQ, EUCOM (J-5)
APO New York 09128

1

Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

1

TIO, OSD/ARPA
Washington, D. C. 20301

1

Defense Documentation Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

20

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIAAP-10A2)
Washington, D. C. 20301

1

Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Library, Classified Reference Section
Washington, D. C. 20305

1

National War College
Washington, D. C. 20305

1

OSD/ODDR&E
Deputy Director (Southeast Asia Program)
Washington, D. C. 20301

1

Department of State

Department of State
Bureau of Political & Military Affairs
Washington, D. C. 20520

1

Department of State
East Asia Bureau
Washington, D. C. 20520

1

Foreign Service Institute (SA-3W)
National Interdepartmental Seminar
State Annex 15
Washington, D. C. 20525

1

Foreign Service Institute
Vietnam Training Center
State Annex 15
Washington, D. C. 20525

1

American Embassy
APO San Francisco 96346

1

American Embassy
US/Vietnam Delegation
APO New York 09777

1

Department of State (Cont.)No. of Copies

American Embassy APO San Francisco 96243	1
USAID DAAA/National Development Vietnam Programs Washington, D. C. 20523	1
USAID (VN-REIR) Washington, D. C. 20523	1
USAID Office of Public Safety Technical Services Division Washington, D. C. 20523	1
Asia Training Center (UH/AID) Honolulu, Hawaii 96818	1
USAID PROG/ER APO San Francisco 96243	1

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-3) Washington, D. C. 20301	1
Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5) Requirements & Development Division Washington, D. C. 20301	1
Joint Chiefs of Staff (SACSA) Washington, D. C. 20301	1

Unified Commands

CINCPAC (Box 13) FPO San Francisco 96610	1
CINCPAC FPO San Francisco 96610 Attn: Research & Engineering Consultant	1
DEPCOMUSMACV APO San Francisco 96375	1
COMUSMACV/ACS (CORDS) Chieu Nho Division APO San Francisco 96222	1

Unified Commands (Cont.)No. of Copies

COMUSMACV/J2(CICV; APO San Francisco 96222	1
COMUSMACV (MACSA) APO San Francisco 96222	1
Commander, U. S. Strike Command MacDill AFB, Florida 33608 Attn: Chief Scientist	1
 <u>U. S. Army</u>	
Assistant for Research, OASA(R&D) Washington, D. C. 20310	1
Director of Studies Office of the Chief of Staff Washington, D. C. 20310	1
The Army Library Washington, D. C. 20310	1
ACTIV Liaison Office, ACSFOR Washington, D. C. 20310	1
ODC/S Military Operations International & Civil Affairs Washington, D. C. 20310	1
Director of Army Research, OCRD Washington, D. C. 20310	1
Southeast Asia Division, OCRD Washington, D. C. 20310	1
Social Science Research Branch, OCRD Washington, D. C. 20310	1
Army Research Office Box CM Durham, North Carolina 27706	1
Dept. of Military Psychology & Leadership USMA, West Point, N. Y. 10996	1
Dept. of Social Sciences USMA, West Point, N. Y. 10996	1

<u>U. S. Army (Cont.)</u>	<u>No. of Copies</u>
Librarian, USMA West Point, N. Y. 10996	1
Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory 2nd & T Streets, SW Washington, D. C. 20315	1
USA CDC/Director of Doctrine Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060	1
Commandant, The Infantry School Fort Benning, Georgia 31905	1
USA CDC/Institute of Special Studies Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060	1
USA CDC/Civil Affairs Agency Fort Gordon, Georgia 30905	1
USA CDC Institute of Strategic & Stability Operations Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307	1
USA CDCEC Technical Reference Library Fort Ord, California 93941	1
USA MICOM (AMSMI-RNM) Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809	2
Hq. CONARC (DCSIT-RD-RD) Fort Monroe, Virginia 23351	1
USAR PAC (ACS/G-2) APO San Francisco 96558	1
Hq. USARV (AVHGC-DST) APO San Francisco 96375	1
Army War College (Library) Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013	1
Army C&GSC Library Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027	1
U. S. Army Institute for Military Assistance Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307	1
ACTIV, APO San Francisco 96384	1
USA CDC/SWA Fort Bragg, North Carolina 38307	1

U.S. Army ARMY (R&D Division)
Box 200, APO New York 09205

DEPCH/JUSMAG
Box 1000, APO San Francisco 96346

1

U. S. Navy

CNO (OP-93)
Washington, D. C. 20350

1

CNO (OP-96)
Washington, D. C. 20350

1

COMNAVFOR Vietnam
FPO San Francisco 96626

1

Naval War College (Library)
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

1

U. S. Naval Academy (Library)
Annapolis, Maryland 21402

1

Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, California 93940

1

Office of Naval Research (ONR-462)
Washington, D. C. 20360

1

Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Washington, D. C. 20340

1

U. S. Marine Corps

Hq. USMC (AO3E)
Washington, D. C. 20380

1

Hq. USMC (AX)
Washington, D. C. 20380

1

Hq. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FPO San Francisco 96610

1

U. S. Air ForceNo. of Copies

Hq. USAF (AFXOSO) Washington, D. C. 20330	1
Hq. USAF (AFXOC) Washington, D. C. 20330	1
Hq. USAF (AFXFF) Washington, D. C. 20330	1
Hq. USAF (AFXOPAB) Washington, D. C. 20330	1
Hq. USAF (AFXPPE) Washington, D. C. 20330	1
Hq. USAF (AFXOSLC) Washington, D. C. 20330	1
Hq. USAF (AFXPPGS) Washington, D. C. 20330	1
Hq. USAF (AFCSAMI) Washington, D. C. 20330	1
Hq. USAF (AFNIN) Washington, D. C. 20330	1
Hq. USAF (AFNINA) Washington, D. C. 20330	1
Hq. AFSC (SCS-6) Andrews AFB Washington, D. C. 20331	1
ADTC (ADO) Eglin AFB, Florida 32542	1
ASD (ASJP) Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433	1
ASD (ASWKS) Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433	1
Hq. OAR, Life Sciences Division 1400 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, Virginia 22209	1
Hq. OAR (RROW) 1400 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, Virginia 22209	1

U. S. Air Force (Cont.)No. of Copies

AFOSR (SRGG) 1

1400 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, Virginia 22209

Office of Research Analyses (OAR) 1

Environmental Analysis Division

Holloman AFB, New Mexico 88330

Air University Library (AUL-SE) 1

Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112

USAFA (DLIB) 1

U. S. Air Force Academy, Colorado 80840

AFIT Library (AFIT-L) 1

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433

Hq. TAC (DID) 1

Langley AFB, Virginia 23365

Hq. PACAF (DI) 1

APO San Francisco 96553

CINCPACAF (DPLPS) 1

APO San Francisco 96553

Other

~~# TACTICAL TECHNOLOGY~~ 1

Remote Area Conflict Information Center

Battelle Memorial Institute

505 King Avenue

Columbus, Ohio 43201

~~#~~ Strategic Technology Office 1

Information Analysis Center

Battelle Memorial Institute

505 King Avenue

Columbus, Ohio 43201

~~Distribution of Appendix E limited to these addressees.~~

FINAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FR-51U-533

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION
(Evaluation of Civilian Techniques)

by

Philip S. McMullan
Martin F. Massoglia
Benjamin S. H. Harris, III
November 1972

Sponsored by:

ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
ARPA Order Nr. 1444
under
U.S. Army Missile Command
Contract No. DAAH01-70-C-0949

RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE
Office of Institute Programs

This research was sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense (DOD) under ARPA Order No. 1444 and was monitored by the U.S. Army Missile Command (USAMICOM) under Contract No. DAAH01-70-C-0949. Views and conclusions expressed herein are the primary responsibility of the authors or the contractor and should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of USAMICOM, ARPA, DOD or any other agency of the Government.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

GENERAL

The overall objective of the research described in the two volumes of this report is to determine whether civilian government agencies and nongovernment organizations (NGO's) engaged in international development assistance are employing methods or techniques that might profitably be adopted by U.S. or allied armed forces to enhance their capability to perform military civic action (MCA) missions.

In accordance with Technical Requirements No. 1444 of Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Order No. 1444 and U.S. Army Missile Command (USAMICOM) Contract No. DAAH01-70-C-0949, completion of this objective required: (1) a comprehensive literature search on civilian government and private agencies, (2) a comprehensive literature search and visits within the continental United States (CONUS) to document MCA experience, (3) in-depth interviews and data collection from selected civilian Government agencies and NGO's, (4) comparison of military and civilian techniques, and (5) development of recommendations to enhance military capability to perform civic action missions. The findings with respect to these objectives are reported in two volumes with the following titles:

Volume I - Evaluation of Civilian Techniques in International Development Assistance.

Volume II - Summary and Recommendations: Comparison of Civilian and Military Techniques.

Data on MCA experience is reported in a companion study entitled Military Civic Action (Evaluation of Military Techniques).

Pertinent findings, conclusions and recommendations from the study are summarized below under the headings: Philosophy and Objectives, Organizational Structure, Personnel Policy, Planning Policies and Project Implementation, and Evaluation. Although civilian government agencies were reviewed in the study, primary emphasis in this summary is on information obtained while comparing NGO techniques with the MCA experience.

PHILOSOPHY AND OBJECTIVES

U.S.-supported MCA is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy and follows a *self help and mutual aid philosophy* which is not unlike that of the civilian organizations. Priorities under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) are dictated in large part by the location and intensity of Communist inspired and supported subversion. The NGO's differ from MCA in that their mission makes their international development assistance activities their primary function, while the international development assistance activities of military forces are either subsidiary to or part of their primary military mission.

While most of the civilian agencies have relatively clear, concise, broad formulations of functional general objectives, the overall objectives of U.S.-supported MCA are not clear from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) definition, and the companion military experience study shows that various interpretations in different parts of the world contribute to misunderstanding and difficulty in evaluation. Military programs which can be labeled *nation-building MCA by indigenous military forces with U.S. advice and assistance* have objectives which are not unlike those of civilian agencies. The objectives of MCA are least like those of the NGO's when the programs can be labeled *image-building MCA by U.S. military forces overseas*.

Currently there are two basic and sometimes conflicting objectives of U.S.-supported MCA programs: (1) economic and social development, and (2) improved standing of the host country military. The almost universal statement of clear, concise, and broad formulation of general objectives by the NGO's suggests that the military could benefit by developing clear and specific objectives for MCA. MCA objectives in areas of the world where subversive and external attack is not imminent are more congruent with those currently in use by NGO's, and it is in such areas that civilian techniques have greater potential for transfer to MCA programs. However, in order to fully capitalize on the NGO experience, it will be necessary to develop an unambiguous system of objectives and clarify the constraints under which MCA programs must operate.

Recommendations

1. Revise the current JCS definition of MCA to remove the ambiguity and permit consistent objectives to be derived by each Service. The revised definition which would be most appropriate for international development assistance, selected from the set proposed in the military report, is as follows:

Military civic action (MCA) is the participation of military forces in projects useful to a local population in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development.

Indigenous MCA is that actively conducted by armed forces among and with their own people.

Nation-building MCA has the objective of contributing to a national program of economic and social development.

Contributions of foreign armed forces are categorized by the nature of the assistance:

MCA advice and assistance includes those activities of foreign military advisors directed toward instructing and encouraging the use of indigenous armed forces in MCA projects.

MCA support includes the activities of a foreign government, including its armed forces, in the provision of funds, manpower, or materials to another country for MCA.

2. Use Country Team input to develop a system of MCA objectives which is consistent with and measured in terms of each country's overall plan for development.

ORGANIZATION

The specific nature of NGO objectives does not require the cumbersome bureaucratic organization usually found in their government counterparts. Most of the NGO's maintain small staffs within relatively simple structures with clearly delineated and defined channels of authority. Such an arrangement enhances communications and flexibility, characteristics which have been found by the NGO's to be important in international development assistance.

Whether large or small, the civilian agencies have organizations which are dedicated to their missions in international development assistance. The U.S. Military, in conformance with Congressional policy, has no dedicated system for performing MCA and is constrained by law from financially supporting host country military forces maintained solely for civic action. U.S.-supported MCA is performed as an adjunct to and in support of normal military missions. This sometimes has resulted in a lack of direction and purpose in MCA projects and programs. U.S. and host country military establishments are often hindered in following the principles of self-help and mutual assistance by higher priorities of other military missions and by the absence of a dedicated organization for international development assistance.

Within the constraints of existing military organization and responsibilities, there appears to be a need for a more precise and exact assignment of MCA planning and operational responsibilities at the staff and unit level.

Recommendation: Establish clear staff responsibility for MCA program planning, operations and evaluation within each Unified Command and subordinate elements in which MCA programs are to be encouraged.

PERSONNEL POLICIES

In personnel *recruitment*, most of the civilian agencies employ active recruitment combined in many instances with referral. U.S. civic action personnel (with few exceptions) are selected from available personnel to fill slots required by military missions. However, screening (through referral and records review) usually precedes assignment to the military advisory system and to service schooling for preparation for such assignments.

The NGO's and the Peace Corps are more meticulous in their *selection* of personnel than are the other civilian agencies or the military. The civilian agencies cite and rank specific criteria for selection of international development assistance personnel. No specific selection criteria were found in the military study, except that the U.S. Navy reports that rigidly prescribed standards are used in the selection of personnel for assignment to Seabee Teams. Of the criteria cited by the civilian agencies in this study as applied in their personnel selection process, the most important appear to be those which relate to *experience*--professional and international experience related to the position; education; language aptitude or proficiency; adaptability; job competence; references; ability to communicate; and ability to withstand cultural shock.

In general, the NGO's do not maintain intensive *training* programs as the emphasis placed on experience, job competence, and education tends to obviate extensive training programs. The Peace Corps, which is a primary source of recruits for the NGO's, maintains an intensive training program. The military typically trains for a particular military occupational specialty (MOS) or career goal with training in civic action as a special and usually small unit of instruction. The Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP) and the Marine Corps Personal Response Program, although not civic action training programs *per se*, are valuable training units for nation building civic action.

The duration of overseas *tours* among civilian agencies is generally more than two years. No generalizations can be made about military tours because of the variety of MCA programs, but mobile training teams for civic action are on temporary duty tours of six months or less.

Civilian agencies emphasize a *role of advice and assistance* for their personnel involved in international development assistance; much of the doctrine of MCA emphasizes the same role for U.S. military personnel, but the field experience review suggests that this MCA role is subordinate to that of other military duties.

The NGO's place emphasis on continuing *personnel evaluation* because of their belief that project success is generally more a function of an individual's ability to adapt and innovate than of any doctrine, methods or techniques in which he is trained. Evaluation instruments apply specifically to the NGO missions. Military personnel evaluation instruments are designed to measure performance in a broad range of assignments.

While it is recognized that the NGO's dedicated mission permits the development and use of personnel policies specific to international development assistance, their criteria and procedures appear to be applicable to the military in the selection of personnel for specific MCA assignments.

Recommendations

1. Incorporate within personnel selection procedures for MCA advisors the relevant criteria used by the NGO's.
2. Use these criteria to select personnel for overseas advisory positions who have the personal attributes and professional experience which are most closely correlated with success in international development assistance.
3. Train and then assign personnel thus selected to countries in which the U.S. will encourage and assist in military participation in nation-building.
4. Permit the personnel thus assigned to concentrate upon their nation-building role for two or more years. (A news release, as of this writing, indicates that the Army is initiating a program to permit up to a six year tour in long tour areas of the world).
5. Continue to place emphasis on the MAOP/Foreign Area Officer Management System (FAOMS) program.
6. With respect to training of officers and enlisted men who may participate in training or advising at the project level, adopt training such as that represented by the U.S. Marines' Personal Response Program for use by all Services.

PLANNING POLICIES AND PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The categories of development assistance used by the civilian agencies are much the same as those listed in the JCS definition of civic action: *education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation*. The civilian categories include all of the MCA list as either primary or subsidiary elements. There is a general trend away from giveaway programs on the premise that such programs tend to rob the recipients of their dignity.

Other than Vietnam, the U.S. resources for civic action are small and receive little attention in Washington. While program decisions appear to be made at Unified Command or Country Team Levels, the process is not adequately described in CONUS literature. MCA program/project selection criteria for areas of relative politico-military stability are quite similar to those applied by civilian agencies; however, no formal procedure was disclosed by which such MCA criteria are applied in either the selection of countries in which MCA programs would be assisted or in the projects to be performed. The NGO planning process is usually formal and can be described systematically.

Several of the U.S. civilian agencies and NGO's have developed guidelines and even detailed manuals to facilitate development assistance project implementation and operation in the field. Military guidelines for MCA project implementation are contained in field manuals and standing operations procedures. Most ~~military~~ programs reviewed are concerned primarily with the completion of short-term, high-impact projects which, ideally, will create a desire among the recipients for continued self-help activity. The NGO's may begin with a high visibility short range project, but the emphasis is upon developing the abilities necessary to carry on future projects. Although many MCA documents agree with these principles, they would require a commitment of time which is often not feasible for the military unit. However, these same MCA documents caution against initiating projects which do not have a high probability of successful completion within available time and resources.

In general, the emphasis in NGO development assistance operations is on careful selection of the project and personnel rather than upon detailed

field operating instructions. The civilian agencies emphasize the implementation of *pilot, demonstration, and self-help* projects; several also advocate *feasibility studies* and employ the *Food-for-Work* concept effectively. Several of the NGO's have developed techniques that appear particularly useful in international development assistance training, such as the utilization of visual aids.

Of factors cited by the civilian agencies, *personnel, advance planning, and flexibility* are considered as most important in pre-determining project success. *Motivation*, of the organization and its personnel, and of the recipients of the assistance, also plays a major role.

The criteria considered by the civilian agencies to be most important in measuring project effectiveness appear to be the *assumption of control* of the project by the indigenous population; the determination that the project has filled a *felt need*; the *development of local skills*; and the *cost/benefits* realized.

If the military is to adopt the project implementation techniques of the civilian agencies, it is necessary that they be willing to advise, assist, and/or support community workers in a neighborhood for an extended period of time; the alternative for countries in which this is not feasible is to increase the extent of cooperation with civilian agencies so that the successful military project may be incorporated into a longer range program of international development assistance.

Recommendation: A clarification of MCA definitions and a change in personnel policies are required in order that the presently adequate MCA planning and operational policies can be successfully implemented.

EVALUATION

The military report discusses the available reports on MCA evaluation in which the subjective judgment of an individual is reported, and details a review of after-action and situation reports which give some information on the material accomplishments of MCA projects. However, the study concluded that objective program or project evaluation procedures are lacking in the military sector. Most of the civilian agencies have some form of evaluation as part of the planning process in order (1) to determine whether they should continue to exist, (2) to select proposed programs/projects which are most likely to accomplish their stated goals and development objectives, (3) to assess the operational efficiency of programs which are initiated, and (4) to evaluate the effectiveness of completed projects. These are essential for organizations which must report to sponsoring bodies and contributors, and they are aided in implementation by having an organization dedicated solely to accomplishing stated objectives.

The military study reviewed the problems and potential of evaluating *image-building* civic action, and the civilian study could add little to this review. Where *nation-building* is the objective, the evaluation techniques of several civilian agencies could be profitably adopted by the military. However, some means must be devised to factor out the specific effect of MCA from the complex interrelationship of all facets of military operation. The techniques used by CARE are most appropriate for use as a model in designing an MCA evaluation system. These stand out because they are consistent from proposal evaluation through project completion. The forms which are used are based upon a system of initial, interim, and final objectives rather than against final material or institutional goals.

While nation-building MCA has common characteristics with the NGO's, unlike the NGO's the military does not have a dedicated reporting and evaluation system. MCA programs normally receive only *ad hoc* evaluation. While there are some grass roots evaluations, the results are aggregated as they move up the command hierarchy with specific impacts of MCA becoming buried with the results of other aspects of military operations. The most

successful NGO's operate under a clear set of program and project objectives which permit consistent and continuous evaluation. Where nation-building is the MCA primary objective, the techniques used by civilian agencies offer promise as the basis for an MCA evaluation system. The CARE system of evaluation, which is most comprehensive and has been tested and proven through many years of use, would probably serve as the best model for the development of an MCA evaluation system.

Recommendation: When objectives have been clarified and staff responsibility assigned, the CARE system of evaluation should be used as a model in developing an evaluation system for nation-building civic action.

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY - RESEARCH REPORTS



5 6853 01058643 1

U153963